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We review the legal provisions of the WTO regime that have important implications for national, 
market-based environmental policies.  We evaluate those provisions for their effects on a member 
country’s ability and incentives to design economically efficient environmental policies.  International 
trade institutions do not recognize the polluter pays principle, posing some challenges for unilateral 
policies addressing cross-border pollutants and leakage.  Nor do they recognize the economic equivalence 
of emission tax and permit regimes, leading to different potential constraints on policy design and leaving 
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ways to enable and encourage good policymaking. 
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Multilateral Trade Agreements and  
Market-Based Environmental Policies 
Carolyn Fischer, Sandra Hoffmann, and Yutaka Yoshino∗ 
Introduction  
The multilateral trading system has evolved continually since its inception following the 
Second World War.  With successes in lowering barriers to trade, along with advances in 
technology, the world has witnessed unprecedented economic globalization in recent decades. 
Countries have become more interdependent through the exchange of goods and services and 
flows of capital, information, and to some extent, labor. How economic globalization and its 
governing institutions affect the environment—locally, nationally, and globally—has been a 
subject of heated debate among policymakers, journalists, academicians, businesses, labor 
unions, and most dramatically, street protestors at some international conferences.  
The policy debate is often characterized in terms of free trade versus fair trade.  Fair-trade 
advocates would modify trade liberalization policies by incorporating more domestic 
environmental and other social concerns, such as labor standards and human rights.  Free-trade 
advocates seek the free flow of goods and services through market mechanisms with minimal 
intervention by national governments, whatever their political and social goals.  In their view, 
protectionism and pollution are separate problems that require separate solutions.  Responding to 
the public debate, researchers began exploring how international trade and the environment are 
related to each other.  However, most studies have confined themselves to the single dimensions 
of economics or law.  
Economists have analyzed how trade liberalization affects environmental quality through 
reallocation of resources, and how environmental policies affect trade patterns.  The main 
hypotheses pursued have been twofold: On the one hand, does freer trade promote better 
environmental protection through rising incomes and the accompanying greater demand for 
environmental services?  On the other hand, does freer trade drive dirty industries to relocate in 
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“pollution havens” and induce governments to “race to the bottom” with lax standards by 
exacerbating the effects on competitiveness of costly environmental regulations?  The empirical 
findings with regard to the latter linkages between trade and the environment have not been 
convincing: there is no clear evidence either that dirty industries migrate or that governments 
reduce environmental regulation in response to trade liberalization.  In fact, there seems to be 
little evidence that differences in environmental standards affect trade patterns in any significant 
manner.1  Some evidence supports the hypothesis that economic growth improves environmental 
quality.2  Still, the debates have by no means concluded.   
While economists have evaluated the broad incentives created by trade liberalization, 
legal analysts have considered the institutional aspects.  They have focused on what international 
trade agreements such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), with the 
accompanying World Trade Organization (WTO), or the North America Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) mean for the governing institutions pursuing national and global environmental goals.  
Indeed, these institutional concerns are at the forefront of the globalization debate.   
Fair-trade and anti-globalization advocates raise concerns that trade agreements impose 
trade liberalization values over other social agendas, preventing individual countries from 
protecting themselves from legitimate harm.  According to Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch, 
recent WTO rulings “reveal a systemic bias in the WTO rules and the WTO dispute resolution 
process against the rights of sovereign states to enact and effectively enforce environmental 
laws.”3  Free-trade advocates fear that socially motivated impediments to liberalization will mask 
illegitimate protectionist goals and will facilitate environmental paternalism, imposing standards 
that prevent countries from choosing their own levels of regulatory stringency according to their 
own situations.  WTO Director General Michael Moore mused, “Perhaps the biggest challenge 
comes from those who want to constrain economic, political and social freedom in the name of 
some higher ideal. Some people cannot accept that others have different values and want to 
impose their own values on them.”4 
                                                 
1  Tobey (1990), Jaffe et al. (1995) and Kahn (2000). 
2  Frankel and Rose (2002), Birdsall and Wheeler (1992), Lucas et al. (1992). 
3 Tuna-Dolphin, Shrimp-Turtle and Venezuela Gas rulings.  
http://www.publiccitizen.org/trade/wto/ENVIRONMENT/ 
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Most trade economists argue that trade and environmental policy fights should be kept in 
separate corners.  Bhagwati (2002) argues that environmental problems should be targeted 
directly, rather than using trade barriers or sanctions, which would only compound the market 
distortion from the original problem: “Two wrongs do not make a right.”  Similarly, trade 
agreements should only be used to liberalize trade. Unfortunately, in practice, international law 
can rarely be applied with surgical precision, and its development with only trade liberalization 
in mind can create problems by not foreseeing the implications for other policies.  With both the 
pro- and anti-WTO camps arguing their opposing points from a base of national sovereignty over 
environmental policy, one may conclude that trade and environmental policies are indeed 
inextricably linked.   
Since few economists have extended economic analysis to these important institutional 
interactions,
5 this paper seeks to fill some of that gap.  Specifically, we study how current legal 
principles and statutory provisions of international trade agreements might restrict or enhance 
national environmental policies, and we evaluate the corresponding impacts on economic 
efficiency.  We focus in particular on the implications of trade agreements for market-based 
environmental policies.  Just as trade negotiators have reoriented trade protection toward price-
based tools (“tarification”), today’s environmental policymakers are relying more heavily on 
fiscal instruments and market-oriented, incentive-based mechanisms, such as taxes and subsidies, 
to achieve their goals.  In the next section, we highlight the legal provisions of the GATT that 
have important implications for national, market-based environmental policies. Then we evaluate 
those provisions for their effects on the economic efficiency of different environmental policies.  
Although regional trade agreements also have implications for national environmental 
policies, we keep our focus on the GATT.  The North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) has some key differences in certain provisions, but for those most relevant to market-
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based policies, the treaty essentially parallels the GATT.  Therefore, this discussion will be 
generally consistent with NAFTA issues as well.6   
The GATT and National Environmental Policies 
Basic Principles 
Global trade is in large part governed by the GATT and related trade agreements under 
the auspices of World Trade Organization (WTO).  The fundamental constraint the GATT legal 
framework imposes on national policymaking involves the nondiscriminatory treatment of goods 
traded between participating countries: 
“We recognize that under WTO rules no country should be prevented from taking measures for the 
protection of human, animal or plant life or health, or of the environment at the levels it considers 
appropriate, subject to the requirement that they are not applied in a manner which would constitute a 
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions 
prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, and are otherwise in accordance with the 
provisions of the WTO Agreements.”7   
National Treatment 
The guiding principle of national treatment is specified in Article III, which requires 
importing countries to treat foreign goods the same way they treat “like” domestic goods. That 
is, foreign goods must not be treated in a “less favorable” way than comparable domestic 
products, and no measures should be applied to foreign goods to protect domestic goods. Article 
III covers not only fiscal measures, such as taxes and subsidies, but also nonfiscal measures, such 
as standards and technical requirements. 
                                                 
6 The possible exception lies in the controversial provision of Chapter 11, Rule (4): protection from indirect 
nationalization or expropriation, or from measures “tantamount to nationalization or expropriation.” However, since 
market-based instruments allow firms to seek the most profitable way of reducing pollution and offer other 
compliance options (like buying permits or paying taxes) should reductions be too difficult, it is hard to conceive of 
an environmental tax or tradable permit policy that would completely nullify the value of an investment.  Although 
market-based policies might reduce returns, they are unlikely to be “tantamount to expropriation;” such challenges 
are most likely to arise from outright product bans that impact single firms.  Market-based policies also have broad 
bases and do not target individual firms. 
7 WTO Ministerial Declaration, Fourth Session, Doha, 9 - 14 November 2001. Resources for the Future  Fischer, Hoffmann, and Yoshino 
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For the most part, this requirement means that countries must impose their environmental 
taxes or regulations equally on domestic as well as imported goods.  Nevertheless, under the 
GATT foreign products may be treated differently for a variety of reasons, whether deliberate (if 
the importing country has particular environmental objectives) or accidental (as side effects of 
environmental policies). For example, if a product could cause environmental damage or health 
problems, the government of the importing country may legitimately bar its importation.  
Least Trade-Restrictive Exceptions 
The general exceptions to nondiscrimination requirements are detailed in Article XX. 
Members may override their GATT obligations under several circumstances relevant for 
environmental policies, which are highlighted in the box.  Exception (b) is if an action is 
necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health.  Exception (g) provides leeway to 
conserve scarce natural resources if such measures are combined with restrictions on domestic 
production or consumption.   
Exception (d) enables actions that are necessary to implement regulations, as long as 
those regulations themselves comply with the GATT, particularly the agreements embedded 
Article III.  Expanding on the internal consistency requirement is a request that in all applications 
of Article XX, countries are asked to choose the least trade-restrictive measures.  Article XX 
singles out “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same 
conditions prevail” and rejects “disguised restriction on international trade.” The concern is that 
the GATT Article III (National Treatment) 
1.  The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and other internal charges, and laws, regulations and 
requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use of 
products, and internal quantitative regulations requiring the mixture, processing or use of products in specified 
amounts or proportions, should not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection 
to domestic production. 
2.  The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting 
party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in 
excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products.  … 
4.  The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting 
party shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like products of national origin 
in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, 
transportation, distribution or use.  The provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the application of 
differential internal transportation charges which are based exclusively on the economic operation of the means 
of transport and not on the nationality of the product. 
(emphasis added)Resources for the Future  Fischer, Hoffmann, and Yoshino 
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environmental policies might be wielded to discriminate against foreign products for strategic 
trade objectives.  Thus, the relationship between Article III and Article XX is essentially an issue 
of balancing domestic environmental protection on one hand and free trade on the other. 
From the perspective of efficient environmental policy design, a narrower question of 
balance arises.  On the one hand, the basic trade principles can not only benefit free exchange but 
also may promote more efficient and consistent environmental policies, at home and in 
competing countries, by preventing protectionist motives from distorting environmental 
regulation.  On the other hand, blunt trade rules may have subtle costs if they prevent or distort 
the application of the most suitable policy tools for different environmental problems.  These 
competing issues reappear in the context of specific policy provisions.   
Subsidies Code 
Today, policymakers are relying more heavily on fiscal instruments and market-oriented, 
incentive-based mechanisms, such as taxes and subsidies, to achieve their environmental goals. 
They may, for example, establish subsidies to encourage environmental protection or offer 
rebates to mitigate the adverse effects of environmental regulations on certain industries.  The 
GATT Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (hereafter, “Subsidies Code”), 
along with Article III, can have important implications for market-based policy instruments. 
For environmentally motivated subsidies to run afoul of the GATT, they must fall first 
within the definition of a subsidy and then within the categories of prohibited or actionable 
subsidies.  Then they must also not qualify under the general exceptions.  Environmental taxes 
are also impacted by the Subsidies Code, which designates the types of taxes that may be 
relieved for exports (and not considered a subsidy) or that may be imposed on imports (to 
counteract a subsidy or to equalize tax incentives). 
the GATT Article XX (General Exceptions) 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means 
of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a 
disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the 
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: 
… (b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
… (d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the 
provisions of this Agreement, 
… (g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in 
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption;…Resources for the Future  Fischer, Hoffmann, and Yoshino 
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Subsidies Defined 
The Subsidies Code limits the concept of a subsidy to financial contributions by the 
government, which includes not only direct monetary transfers but also government revenues 
otherwise due that are forgone or not collected (e.g., tax credits). For a subsidy to be actionable, 
and thus subject to countervailing duty by an importing country, it has to be targeted at specific 
beneficiaries, such as certain industries or enterprises, within the exporting country (Article 2).  
Thus, a subsidy designed to benefit the economy as a whole, or distributed evenly throughout 
some sector of the economy, would not qualify as actionable.  Furthermore, even a specific 
subsidy must be shown to have injured the industries or interests of another country in order to 
justify countervailing duties (Article 5(a), (b) and (c)). 
Specific subsidies may fall into 3 categories under the GATT: prohibited, actionable, and 
nonactionable.  In principle, the GATT prohibits subsidies for exports except for certain primary 
products, such as agricultural products. Also prohibited are subsidies requiring use of domestic 
inputs over imported goods.  Actionable subsidies are subject to countervailing duties by 
importing countries.  The GATT allows an importing country to impose countervailing duties if 
other WTO members’ subsidies cause injury to its domestic industry. More precisely, subsidies 
can trigger countervailing duties if they nullify or impair benefits accruing directly or indirectly 
to other WTO members (in particular, a country may not introduce or increase a subsidy that has 
the effect of negating the value of a tariff cut), or in general, seriously prejudice the interest of 
another member.
8  Thus, if a governmental assistance scheme is targeted to a specific industry 
and goes beyond temporary assistance for adapting to a new environmental regulation,  that 
subsidy might be subject to another country’s countervailing duty. 
                                                 
8 “Serious prejudice” may arise if the effect of a subsidy is manifested in import displacement or impediment in the 
subsidizing-country markets; significant price undercutting, significant price suppression, price depression, or lost 
sales in any market; or an increase in world market share (Article 6.2). The burden is on the subsidizing government 
to demonstrate that serious prejudice did not result from the subsidies in question.  Resources for the Future  Fischer, Hoffmann, and Yoshino 
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Nonactionable subsidies are not subject to such countervailing duties. Specifically, the 
Subsidies Code considers subsidies for adapting existing plant and equipment to new 
environmental requirements nonactionable (Article 8.2(c)).  In addition, the GATT also classifies 
as nonactionable certain subsidies for industrial research and development activities (Article 
8.2(a)), which would include research on pollution prevention and environmental protection 
technologies. 
Border Adjustment of Taxes  
Incentive-based taxes like environmental levies tend to be relatively small in scope and 
revenues, compared to most taxes, and infrequently applied compared to regulations (with the 
exception perhaps of gasoline taxes in Europe or cigarette taxes).  Thus, more attention has been 
paid to achieving efficient incentives across national borders for the major revenue raisers, like 
income or consumption taxes. Governments exempt exported goods from indirect taxes, such as 
a value-added tax (VAT) or sales tax, which are to be paid by consumers in the country of 
destination. In general, the GATT permits adjustment at the border for indirect taxes on “like” 
products, but not for direct taxes, such as income tax, which are imposed on factors of 
AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES  (Selected Highlights) 
(Does not apply to certain agricultural products) 
 
Part II:  Prohibited Subsidies 
Art. 3.1 (a) subsidies contingent… upon export performance 
     (b) subsidies contingent… upon the use of domestic over imported goods. 
 
Part III:  Actionable Subsidies 
Art. 5: Adverse Effects 
     (a) injury to the domestic industry of another Member; 
… (c) serious prejudice to the interests of another Member. 
Art. 6.1: Serious Prejudice 
     (c) subsidies… other than one-time measures… which are given merely to provide time for the development 
of long-term solutions and to avoid acute social problems;… 
 
Part IV:  Non-Actionable Subsidies 
Art. 8.2 (a) assistance for research activities… 
     (b) assistance to disadvantaged regions… 
     (c) assistance to promote adaptation of existing facilities to new environmental requirements imposed by law 
and/or regulations which result in greater constraints and financial burden on firms, provided that the assistance:
           (i) is a one-time non-recurring measure; and 
           (ii) is limited to 20 per cent of the cost of adaptation; and 
           (iii) does not cover the cost of replacing and operating the assisted investment…; and 
           (iv) is directly linked to and proportionate to a firm's planned reduction of nuisances and pollution, and 
does not cover any manufacturing cost savings which may be achieved; and 
           (v) is available to all firms which can adopt the new equipment and/or production processes. Resources for the Future  Fischer, Hoffmann, and Yoshino 
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production in the country of origin. The legal justification for the differential treatment is the 
difference in purpose between production taxes, which are origin based, and consumption taxes, 
which are destination based. 
While it is generally clear that taxes on products are border adjustable and taxes on 
production are not, the issue becomes murky looking at taxes on products used in the production 
process.  Treatment of intermediate inputs is a serious issue of concern for environmental tax 
policy, since many such taxes are levied on inputs like fuel or chemicals that serve as a proxy for 
actual emissions.  The Subsidies Code has a special provision for cumulative prior-stage indirect 
taxes on goods and services used in the production of exported products, as distinct from value-
added taxes. 
The GATT Subsidies Code initially specified that taxes on inputs to production are 
border-adjustable only when the goods are physically incorporated into the exported products.
9  
Thus, for example, a gasoline tax that may have environmental purposes would be adjustable, 
because energy is a qualifying material input in the exported products. But an environmental tax 
on noxious emissions would not be adjustable because pollution is a “disincorporated material 
output.”  Thus, for example, a tax on leather would be adjustable, as a qualifying material input 
in exported baseball gloves, but a tax on the effluents from the tanning process would not, since 
effluents are a disincorporated material output.  In many countries, environmental policies still 
take the form of taxes on consumption of pollution-related products, and thus the adjustability of 
these taxes at the border can create an asymmetry with taxes levied on actual emissions.  
Differential treatment may also arise for other policy tools, like emission allowances or tradable 
performance standards, which offer comparable incentives to a tax but are legally distinct.   
A revision in the Uruguay Round broadened the category of adjustable taxes to allow 
rebates for indirect taxes on goods and services if they are “consumed” in the production of the 
exported product: “in addition to physically incorporated inputs, export rebates are permitted on 
“energy, fuels and oil used in the production process.”
10  This expansion raises critical questions 
for policies concerning energy or greenhouse gas emissions: Are specific taxes on energy are 
adjustable?  If so, can adjustments only be applied to exports and not to imports? Allowing tax 
                                                 
9 the GATT Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Article VI, XVI, and XXIII of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade.  
10 GATT Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Annex II, footnote 61. Resources for the Future  Fischer, Hoffmann, and Yoshino 
10 
rebates for exported goods without providing for tax levies on imported goods would create an 
important asymmetry.  The U.S. government has been of the view that this footnote to Subsidy 
Code should not open the door to new border tax adjustments on energy.
11  However, the issue 
has not been clearly settled among legal experts.   
WTO Disputes 
Real understanding of the application of the GATT to market-based policies will come 
through experience with the WTO dispute resolution forum.  Although they precede finalization 
of the Uruguay Round, two resolved cases offer insight into some of the key issues discussed 
here.  The 1987 WTO case regarding the U.S. feedstock chemicals tax (Superfund Tax) is 
relevant for the treatment of environmental taxes on inputs.  The 1993-94 dispute over corporate 
average fuel economy (CAFE) standards reflects the balancing act between Articles III and XX, 
as well at the politics of trade negotiations.   
Superfund Tax 
To raise revenue for cleanup operations, the Superfund Act12 imposed a tax on certain 
chemical inputs.  Not only were border adjustments allowed on the inputs themselves, but a tax 
was also imposed on imported final products according to the content of feedstock chemicals 
used in production, assessed by weight.  The European Community objected, but the WTO ruled 
that the border adjustment could stand.13  Important to their findings were that 1) the tax was 
designed to raise revenue, not create incentives, and was imposed on like products; 2) the 
polluter pays principle is irrelevant anyway for the GATT; and 3) the inputs were taxed based on 
use, not value, and constituted part of the final product.14 
Thus, polluting materials that are physically incorporated into the final products can be 
made subject to the importing country’s taxes as long as such taxes are imposed equitably on 
both imported goods and “like” domestic goods.  The definition of “physically incorporated” is 
                                                 
11 Charnovitz (1994). 
12 United States Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986. 
13 United States – Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, Report of the Panel adopted on 17 June 
1987 (L/6175 - 34S/136) 
14 Interestingly, though, the Panel quoted Article II, Paragraph 2(a), “in respect of an article from which the 
imported product has been manufactured or produced in whole or in part,” not the term “physically incorporated.” Resources for the Future  Fischer, Hoffmann, and Yoshino 
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revealed to be somewhat open to interpretation.  The nature of the pollution problem does not 
matter in the case of a tax, which can also have non-environmental purposes in the form of 
revenue. The pollution rationale might well matter in the case of a regulatory standard. 
CAFE Standards 
The dispute over CAFE standards reveals some of the room for interpretation between 
national treatment and the conservation policy exception.  With CAFE standards, the U.S. 
government imposed on both U.S. and foreign automobile manufacturers a minimum standard 
for miles per gallon for each fleet to meet on average, as opposed to specific car makes and 
models. A penalty fee was levied if overall vehicle sales did not meet the standard.  The 
European Community challenged the tax in 1993, alleging that it unduly disadvantaged 
European manufacturers, who exported more large luxury vehicles that were less fuel-efficient.
15   
In 1994, the GATT dispute panel found that an imported large car whose fuel economy 
could not be averaged with small cars would be treated less favorably than a “like” domestic 
large car in a fleet with many small cars, and that the regulation was therefore inconsistent with 
Article III:4.  Then, a distinction was made between the fleet averaging requirement and separate 
accounting for foreign vehicles.   
The basic policy of fleet averaging was granted exception under Article XX(g), since 
CAFE could be construed as intending to conserve an exhaustible resource, petroleum.  
Interestingly, in the deliberations, the panel declined to hold the US regulation to the “least trade 
restrictive” standard.  The panel agreed with the EU that many more efficient and less 
discriminatory policy tools were available to reduce fuel consumption, like gasoline taxes.  A 
legislative history of protectionist motives for CAFE could also be documented.  However, the 
panel found it sufficient that improving fuel efficiency was a legitimate regulatory objective, and 
that CAFE did contribute to that goal.  It may be interesting to note that the decision was 
promulgated while the U.S. Congress was deliberating over ratification of the Uruguay Round. 
The separate accounting rule meant that multinational manufacturers could not use 
foreign imports to offset domestic vehicles with different fuel economy characteristics, or visa-
versa.  The panel found this rule inconsistent with the GATT, since it did not contribute directly 
                                                 
15 In fact, 100% of the penalty imposed by this tax was borne by European companies. Resources for the Future  Fischer, Hoffmann, and Yoshino 
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to fuel conservation in the US and would not meet the Article XX(g) exception.16  Thus, an 
accompanying penalty fee would not be legitimate under Article XX(d).  However, the panel 
report was never adopted, and the U.S. dismissed the need to modify the separate accounting 
provision.17   
Implications for Market-Based Policy Instruments 
The desirability of border adjustment of environmental policies depends largely on two 
factors: whether the pollution problem is local or transboundary in nature, and whether the 
pollution is generated by consumption or production activities.  Local environmental 
externalities occur when the ecological or health damages remain in the same country in which 
the polluting behavior takes place.  Cross-border pollutants cause damages in countries outside 
the location of the generating activity, and global pollutants are those that impose damages on 
the emitting country as well as others.  Consumption externalities arise from use of the product, 
whereas production externalities come from the process of making the product.  A gray area, in 
which energy products fall, is the consumption of polluting materials in the production process.  
For example, a pollution problem may emit directly from the consumption of fuel (as with 
carbon dioxide), or it may be in large part a function of the production process and emissions 
abatement equipment (as with sulfur dioxide). 
Examples of a local consumption externality include packaging waste, which piles up in 
local landfills, or second-hand smoke.  A local production externality could be NOx emissions 
from power plants affecting local air quality or chemical effluents from paper mills running into 
an inland lake.  These pollutants may also cross borders in cases of wind or water transport.  
Greenhouse gases are a prime example of a global pollutant, and they can be generated both by 
consumption activities, like automobile emissions from driving, and production activities, like 
natural gas flaring in oil drilling. 
We examine the implications of the national treatment, border adjustment, and subsidies 
provisions for the choice and implementation of different types of market based policies in the 
different pollution contexts.  We focus first on environmental taxes, followed by emission 
                                                 
16 Committee on Trade and Environment - GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Practice Relating to GATT Article XX, 
Paragraphs (b), (d) and (g) - Note by the Secretariat, 08/03/2002. 
17 Vogel (1997). Resources for the Future  Fischer, Hoffmann, and Yoshino 
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allowances, including allocation issues, and finally subsidies.  Table 1 summarizes the economic 
rationales and trade rules regarding border tax adjustments for environmental policies.  The cases 
are discussed in detail with respect to environmental taxes, but apply to environmental 
regulations more generally. 
Environmental Taxes 
Environmental taxes “internalize” externalities by charging the polluter for the damages 
caused, so that the polluter takes those costs into account in determining his behavior.  Some 
taxes are “user fees,” which charge participants for a public good or service, like park 
maintenance or regulatory enforcement costs.  Incentive-based taxes are designed primarily to 
alter behavior, while user fees are intended primarily to raise revenue.  Many environmental 
taxes combine some aspects of both goals, and both types are consistent with the widely 
recognized “polluter pays principle.”  However, the GATT does not formally incorporate the 
polluter pays principle and can in certain instances give inconsistent guidelines. 
Consumption Externalities 
Local externalities can be fully internalized by applying taxes directly to the domestic 
activities that generate them.  Environmental taxes for local externalities need not be harmonized 
across borders, but rather should reflect local conditions. If the externalities are purely a 
byproduct of consumption, the government should tax consumption of both domestic goods and 
imported foreign goods. In general, this takes the form of an indirect tax, and there should be no 
trade issues. For example, gasoline consumption can be taxed to reflect related damages from 
local air pollution and congestion, and no distinction can or should be made according to whether 
the product was refined at home or imported.  For exported products, the Subsidy Code (Article 
3.1(a) and Annex I note 58) allows border tax adjustments in the form of tax rebates for exported 
goods, and imports are subject to the same national taxes, based on the principle of national 
treatment (GATT Article III), in the same way that excise taxes are charged for purposes other 
than environmental goals.  
For cross-border consumption externalities, efficiency dictates that each consuming 
country account for the damages occurring abroad as well as at home.  The result would be for 
each to tax domestic and imported products at the global Pigouvian level, and border adjustments 
would be used to avoid double taxation.  On its own, however, a consuming country would have 
little incentive to tax its own consumers for effects incurred abroad.  The preference would be to 
charge only for domestic damages, and to “free ride,” enjoying the benefits of any regulation Resources for the Future  Fischer, Hoffmann, and Yoshino 
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undertaken abroad.  The countering policy to insufficient regulation by its trading partner would 
be for the damaged country to tax its own polluting exports to the consuming country.  Though 
an unlikely policy, it should not conflict with trade rules, since they are designed to reduce tariffs 
on imports, not exports.  However, the effectiveness of taxing exports is limited by the extent to 
which the incidence of the tax would actually be borne by the foreign consumers.  For a small 
country (or industry) that cannot influence market prices, the effect would be primarily to crowd 
out its exports, rather than raise prices and reduce foreign consumption.  An export tax cannot 
address the externalities generated by consumption of the partner country’s domestically 
manufactured goods, nor would there be an incentive to charge for the global consequences of 
incremental pollution.  These problems highlight the need for diplomacy and a coordinated 
international response to cross-border pollution. 
Production Externalities 
Many pollutants are byproducts of production and manufacturing processes rather than 
use of the final consumer product.  In this case, environmental taxes should apply to production 
emissions.  Where actual emissions cannot be monitored, taxes may be levied on behavior or 
inputs contributing to emissions.  However, complicated legal questions surround the issue of 
input taxes.  For taxes on materials that are physically incorporated into the final products, the 
GATT does allow border tax adjustments for both exports and imports.  However, no 
adjustments are allowed for disincorporated inputs, including emissions, and adjustment for 
energy inputs may only be allowed for exports, if at all. 
For a local pollutant, few economic rationales exist to tax imports, since the related 
production externalities are incurred elsewhere.  Nor should exported products be exempt from 
the taxes accumulated during production, since the externality remains at home regardless of the 
destination of the product.  However, pressure for such relief may arise from other concerns over 
the competitiveness of local manufacturing.  Exempting exports from the tax violates the polluter 
pays principle, and could arguably qualify as an actionable subsidy under the GATT, depending 
on the design of the tax and rebate.  While the trade partner would not suffer environmental 
damages, and from a sovereignty perspective should not be concerned with another country’s 
local pollution, relative competitiveness would be affected.  On the other hand, taxing imports 
would also violate polluter pays, and can conflict with the GATT, but not necessarily.  The 
Superfund feedstock chemicals tax is an example of such a case. 
For a cross-border pollutant, the efficient response to production externalities is similar, 
but raised by the scope of the damages: each country should tax the emissions associated with Resources for the Future  Fischer, Hoffmann, and Yoshino 
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producing both domestic and exported products at the global Pigouvian level.  Again, absent an 
international agreement, individual countries have little incentive to raise production costs for 
impacts felt abroad.   
The response to insufficient regulation abroad would be to tax imports to the extent the 
associated emissions are not taxed by the exporting country.  Such an adjustment would certainly 
conflict with the GATT, however.  If one country treats all production the same, whether for 
domestic or foreign use, having an emissions tax that is too low by global standards is not an 
actionable subsidy.  Meanwhile, if the trade partner taxes imports to make up for the difference, 
it can be in violation of the “like treatment” requirements, since the corresponding home country 
tax is on emissions and not the like product.   
Similarly, a country with a relatively stringent emissions tax might like to offset the 
impacts on competitiveness, which can be justified if it prevents leakage toward higher-emitting 
production by less regulated sectors.18  Ideally, the offsetting mechanism would not exempt 
exports from emissions taxes altogether, but offer a subsidy to output while retaining the direct 
incentive to reduce emissions.  A direct subsidy would certainly violate the GATT.  Another 
option is an earmarked tax-rebate scheme, like the Swedish NOx tax, which rebates emissions tax 
revenues back to firms according to output shares, and behaves much like a tradable performance 
standard or output-allocated permits.  Such schemes would likely pass muster with the trade 
rules, since the rebate applies to all output, not just exports.  Still, arguments could be made 
under the GATT that the rebate is an actionable subsidy if tax earmarking is applied to export-
oriented sectors and not others, although the leakage justification is by definition stronger in 
trade-sensitive sectors. 
Environmental Taxes on Inputs 
As a result of these restrictions, countries may choose less efficient environmental taxes, 
eschewing actual emissions, which are disembodied, in favor of input taxes that may be deemed 
border adjustable.  From a tax economics perspective, border adjustments for taxes imposed on 
intermediate goods are needed for tax neutrality, so that the taxes do not change countries’ 
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competitive positions.
19  However, neutrality is not necessarily efficient for all environmental 
taxes.  From an environmental perspective, border tax adjustments are only appropriate in certain 
situations.  One is if the inputs contribute to a global pollution problem, and the trading partner 
country either does not tax the input or is also adjusting at the border.  Maintaining 
competitiveness in the first case is important to prevent leakage of production, and thereby 
emissions, to the under-taxing country.  In the second case, if the partner country has a tax and 
adjusts at the border, the home country must also make adjustments to prevent double taxation or 
escape from taxation.   
Another situation is if the input, as incorporated into the final product, poses a local 
consumption externality.  This would be the tax equivalent of a product standard.  The tax on 
import content could give an incentive to foreign producers to use less of the damaging input, 
and relief on exports is appropriate since the damage is exported as well.  The exception is when 
the use of the input in production creates a local pollution externality; in that case, border 
adjustment when trading the input is appropriate, but not when trading the final product, since 
the pollution damages do not follow the product. 
As explained earlier, the legality of rebates for environmental taxes on energy is still 
unsettled. Apparently, the inclusion of energy inputs with physically incorporated ones resulted 
from a “gentleman’s agreement” that it would address a narrow set of taxes from a limited group 
of countries and would not be applied to energy taxes more generally, including carbon taxes.20  
But since the agreement appears to be absent in the public record of the Uruguay Round, and 
adjustment of energy taxes has not yet emerged as an international legal dispute, it remains of 
concern to some environmental legal experts.
21  Additional confusion surrounds whether the 
GATT would allow border adjustments for energy taxes on exports but not on imports. 
Border adjustability may then impact the choice of environmental policy tool, particularly 
when competitiveness issues are of paramount political concern. Producers may prefer indirect 
taxes on products rather than direct taxes on production so that taxes can be adjusted at the 
border.  Not only would such an adjustment not be efficient when the production process causes 
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environmental externalities, but an indirect tax would not be well equipped to incorporate 
incentives for process changes or end-of-pipe pollution abatement. 
Implications for Tradable Emissions Allowances 
Although allowances in an emissions market function much like taxes in terms of their 
economic and incentive effects, they may not be recognized as equivalent by trade law.  A 
system of domestic tradable emissions allowances (permits) is in itself consistent with the 
GATT, particularly given the general exceptions clause and that such a program would almost 
always be less trade restrictive than command-and-control regulations.  However, a few design 
aspects could trigger questions about GATT consistency.  First, incorporating border adjustment 
into a system of tradable permits—that is, requiring them for imports and exempting exports—
could raise many of the same issues as with taxes and more regarding regulation.  Second, a 
country could challenge the way in which permits were allocated by another government.  
Finally, providing for international trade in emission allowances raises a host of questions about 
how WTO rules would apply to allowance trades. 
Border Adjustments 
The economic rationales for border adjustment of emissions permits would parallel those 
for environmental taxes, depending on the type of pollutant and the source activity.  If permits 
become treated like taxes under the law, then the previous analysis applies.  Declaring tradable 
permits legally dissimilar to indirect taxes, which is likely, leads to two possibilities for 
incorporating border adjustments: 1) it may be more difficult, since no provisions are explicitly 
made for it, as with taxes, or 2) it may be easier, since nothing explicitly disallows it, but some 
other caveats may apply.   
Article XI of the GATT prohibits quantitative restrictions, including quotas, import and 
export licenses.  To avoid a challenge of border adjustment on imports, importers must be given 
even footing on access to permits.  This may mean allocating some to importers, withholding 
some for auction, and/or assuring a well-functioning permit market.  Alternatively, the point of 
compliance for the permit system may have to be placed further downstream, away from the 
border transaction.  An example would be to place the incidence of the carbon permit 
requirement on the combustion activity, rather than upstream at the point of fuel sales.  The issue Resources for the Future  Fischer, Hoffmann, and Yoshino 
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may also be relevant for exports: for example, if electricity consumers rather than producers are 
responsible for compliance, a requirement on foreign buyers to hold permits could amount to an 
export license.22   
Economists are usually indifferent to which party to a transaction bears the compliance 
requirement—the incidence of the tax or permit cost will be shared between them regardless of 
who pays.  The choice depends more on the costs of administering the program and the 
appropriate target of the policy, be it emissions or output. Of concern is that if WTO 
interpretations diminish options for determining the point or target of compliance, the limitations 
could be costly.  While making downstream emitters responsible for permits is best when 
process improvements and end-of-pipe abatement technologies are available, for pollutants like 
carbon which are proportional to fuel input use, being able to enforce a permit program upstream 
is a valuable option, leading to broader coverage and lower administrative costs.23 
Typically, a domestic emissions trading program targets actual emissions, which are 
considered disincorporated inputs that are ineligible for adjustment in the tax analogy.  
Exempting exported products or imposing permit requirements on imported products for 
embodied emissions would likely violate the national treatment clause.  The exception could be a 
greenhouse gas trading program, requiring permits for energy inputs according to their carbon 
intensity.  In this case, the uncertainty surrounding treatment of fuels compounds the uncertainty 
regarding non-tax market-based instruments.  However, if one accepts the “gentleman’s 
agreement” on the limited use of border adjustments for energy, they would likely be limited for 
permits as well.  
Grandfathered Allowances 
Economists have shown that grandfathered permits, allocated in lump-sum fashion, have 
much of the same incentive and efficiency effects of auctioned permits.24  However, instead of 
raising revenues for the government, the value of the emissions asset is given to the firms, which 
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24 Differences arise if the grandfathered permits are not given unconditionally, distorting long-run incentives, or if 
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can represent an important transfer of wealth.25  One question for the legal institutions is whether 
this transfer could be construed as an implicit subsidy.  The other is whether grandfathering 
disadvantages foreign traders who do not receive an allocation.   
Recall that to be actionable, a subsidy must involve a direct transfer or foregone revenues 
and it must have specific beneficiaries (Subsidy Code, Article 1).  It is unlikely an equitable 
domestic allocation method would be construed in this manner, particularly since the assets 
transferred are created by an environmental regulation and since a presumption of revenue 
collection would be questionable, given the rarity of auctioning in current experience.  
Furthermore, environmental subsidies can be considered nonactionable, if their purpose is to ease 
adaptation to new environmental regulations, an argument often made for grandfathering.  But 
the GATT Subsidy Code also requires that the transfers be transitory (Article 8.2(c)), which they 
generally are not.  A biased permit allocation that favors specific industries or a specific 
domestic firm, and that injures the industries or interests of another country, would more likely 
be considered actionable.  In addition to the subsidies questions, the Article XI prohibition on 
quantitative restrictions may mean that, in the absence of a well-functioning secondary market 
for permits, some allowances would have to be set aside to assure access by foreign competitors.  
However, absent any case law, it is difficult to guess how a WTO panel might rule in these 
regards. 
Allocating permits by auction for domestic and imported polluting goods would seem to 
avoid all of these problems.  Auctioning also happens to be the allocation method usually 
preferred by economists, for efficiency and revenue recycling purposes.  However, some form of 
giveaway is often necessary to secure acceptance of the policy in the first place, so restricting 
allocation options may inhibit the implementation of some good policies.  In other cases, 
strategic allocations rules can be useful to help offset other distortions in markets with 
environmental externalities. 
Output-Based Allocation 
With output-based allocation, permits are distributed to each participating producer 
according to its share of output among related domestic producers.  In effect, this mechanism 
combines a cost of emissions with a subsidy to output, in the form of more permit allocations. 
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The implicit subsidy serves to mitigate the price increases associated with the regulation, but it 
also reduces conservation incentives and increases reliance on technologies that reduce emission 
rates in order to meet the cap.
26  In general, compared to lump-sum allocations or auctioning, the 
implicit subsidy from output-based allocation creates inefficient incentives, although some 
justification can lie in the prevention of emissions leakage to unregulated producers.27  This 
scheme is still under consideration as a potential policy tool, but it has gained attention as a 
possible distribution mechanism in a cap-and-trade system, such as tradable emissions permits 
for carbon dioxide and NOx.  The question is whether a WTO panel would consider this implicit 
subsidy an actionable subsidy.   
The output-based allocation mechanism spans several rate-based environmental policy 
tools with similar incentives, including permit allocations, the tax-rebate scheme mentioned 
earlier, and also tradable performance standards. CAFE standards relate to this category, since 
the fleetwide average fuel economy standard mimics an intrafirm tradable performance standard, 
where each company trades “permits” among the makes and models within its own fleet to 
achieve the average level set by the government.  Thus, the WTO panel decision on CAFE may 
offer insights into the application of output-based allocation schemes more generally.  The 
finding that fleetwide averaging was a reasonable regulation under the GATT suggests that 
output-based allocation, built as an intrinsic design feature of a permit or tax system, would also 
be consistent.  Some questions could arise depending on the specific rules for incorporating 
imports and exports into the program, but the principle is not likely to be problematic.  In fact, a 
system of tradable permits with output-based allocation would better follow “like” treatment 
standards than CAFE, which does not allow trading across manufacturers, implying that each 
manufacturer faces different values for fuel economy improvements.   
Unfortunately, 100% earmarking of emission allowances (or tax revenues) to output is 
rarely efficient.  The size of the optimal subsidy depends on true emissions leakage: the extent to 
which the products of the regulated sectors can be easily substituted with unregulated ones, and 
the extent to which the accompanying emissions are damaging to the regulating country.  
However, an efficiently targeted subsidy to prevent emissions leakage in trade-sensitive sectors 
would likely be perceived as GATT-inconsistent, either if designed as separate from the permit 
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program (violating the Subsidy Code) or as differing output allocation rules within a program 
(violating national treatment).     
International Allowance Trading 
Thus far we have focused on domestic emissions trading programs.  For global 
pollutants, like greenhouse gases, the efficiency gains from allowing cross-border trades are 
expected to be significant, and trade is expected to be a key component of the implementation of 
the Kyoto Protocol.  Likewise, concerns that each developed country make a reasonable effort to 
reduce its own emissions lead to calls for “supplementarity” provisions restricting trade, as well 
as limitations to purchasing “hot air,” excess allowances from the former Soviet Union.  Thus, 
the question of international trading of emissions allowances is of utmost importance. 
For the WTO, allowances themselves cannot logically be considered products and 
thereby subject to the prohibition on quantitative restrictions, since that is their definition, unless 
exempted under general exceptions.  More likely, they are “licenses… entitling (under specified 
conditions) the holder to carry out a regulated activity within its territory.”28  If not officially 
goods, tradable permits still have financial value, and thus may be indirectly subject to the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).  These rules may prevent GATS members 
with liberalized financial sectors from restricting permit imports from other member countries, 
creating problems for supplementarity provisions.  On the other hand, under GATS, while the 
transaction could not be prohibited, the importing country government would not be obligated to 
recognize the permit.  The potential for complications underscores the need to negotiate 





Governments often provide subsidies to encourage industries to engage in pollution 
abatement activities.  Abatement subsidies can be applied to emissions-reducing activities during 
                                                 
28  Werksman (1999), p 255. Resources for the Future  Fischer, Hoffmann, and Yoshino 
22 
production or consumption.  In the short run, they can offer equivalent incentives to an emissions 
tax, since the polluting agent saves money by emitting less.  However, in the long run they 
inhibit incentives to reduce emissions by exiting the industry, and are therefore less efficient, 
violating the polluter-pays principle. Furthermore, the subsidies must be financed from general 
public revenues, which are costly to raise.  However, domestic politics may argue for subsidies 
over taxes.  
In the context of trade and the environment, abatement subsidies pose fewer issues than 
the other policy tools we have discussed, since border tax adjustment is not likely to be relevant. 
The GATT Subsidy Code explicitly allows domestic subsidies that alleviate the cost of adapting 
to new national environmental regulations. Abatement subsidies per se would therefore not be 
problematic; rather, it would be a matter of how the subsidy is coupled with other factors and 
conflicts with other parts of GATT provisions. Abatement subsidies that surpass transitional 
assistance may be frowned upon; however, since unlike the implicit subsidies discussed above, 
they are directly tied to environmental improvement, they may receive some cover from the 
general exceptions rule—unless a less trade-restrictive measure could achieve the goals. They 
could easily trigger GATT action if tied to the export performance of products receiving the 
subsidy, or to use of domestic products over imported products (GATT Subsidy Code Article 
3.1(a)(b)). Although such linkages are not likely to be explicit, the Subsidy Code prohibits 
abatement subsidies as long as there is a de facto relationship between the subsidy and 
preferential treatment for domestic products. 
Ecodumping 
An important question is whether the lack of strictly enforced environmental regulations 
can be considered an implicit subsidy to particular industries, against which other countries could 
apply countervailing duties, or “ecoduty.” This issue arises in the debate over the legality of 
“ecodumping” duties—the imposition of duties on imports from countries with lax 
environmental regulations. So far, no countries have imposed such duties to offset cost 
differentials due to national differences in pollution regulations. Yet interpreting some forms of 
environmental regulation (or lack thereof) as implicit subsidies could turn many existing national 
environmental policies into anticompetitive practices.  Whether the GATT applies to implicit 
subsidies related to environmental policies is a quite subtle question, subject to further 
refinement through WTO rulings in actual cases. 
The current dispute over Canadian softwood lumber may offer some clarification.  The 
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forest resources charge below-market fees for logging rights.  Conservationists support the 
retaliation, arguing that lax environmental regulations and enforcement constitute an implicit 
subsidy as well, contributing to stream and habitat degradation.29  Canada disputes the claim that 
the right to harvest standing timber (stumpage) constitutes a “financial contribution” in the sense 
of Article 1.1 of the Subsidies Code. 
Conclusion 
Most of the restrictions that multilateral trade agreements pose for market-based 
environmental policies are speculative at this point.  Emissions taxes and tradable permit systems 
are not so widespread and have not yet significantly affected export industries.  To challenge an 
environmental policy under the GATT, a member country must show both inconsistency with 
some rule and harm from the resulting trade impacts.  Furthermore, to prove that the policy is not 
worthy of exception, the complainant must show that a less trade-restrictive policy option is 
available and effective, or possibly even that the policy does not contribute toward achieving a 
reasonable environmental goal at all.   
Overall, in terms of national environmental policies, the GATT seems to have both room 
for interpretation and room for improvement.  For the most part, the GATT can be (or can be 
made) quite consistent with sound market-based environmental policy.  Where conflicts might 
arise has to do with particular aspects of policy design: border adjustments, allocation of 
emission rents, cross-border permit trades, and subsidies.   
For local pollution problems, the GATT is largely consistent with efficient environmental 
policymaking.  The exception is in the case of polluting inputs, where the GATT permits based 
on rules regarding physical incorporation, not the polluter-pays principle.  These would not 
generally prevent a country from designing an efficient policy for addressing a local externality, 
but they would allow the country to incorporate trade-motivated adjustments into environmental 
policy.  If that option is tempting, it may encourage countries to prefer input-oriented tax policies 
over more efficient emissions-oriented programs. 
For global pollution problems, the GATT may create some barriers to implementing 
economically justified policies to prevent emissions leakage from more stringently regulated 
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countries.  However, there are likely to be some design options, like output-based allocation, that 
do not qualify as actionable subsidies.  In any case, global pollutants require concerted 
international effort and agreement to be properly addressed, since individual countries have 
insufficient incentives on their own.  Then international environmental agreements should 
themselves deal with the issue of border adjustment for market-based emission control programs.  
Some of that should be made easier by international trading in emissions allowances.  WTO rules 
will have to catch up quickly to cope with these rather unorthodox assets that will have 
considerable financial and environmental value.  
Many unanswered questions remain.  Will environmental tax and permit policies that are 
economically equivalent be viewed as legally equivalent by trade institutions?  Might the 
ongoing earmarking of pollution fee revenues to subsidize investment in pollution control 
equipment qualify as an actionable subsidy?  Can the free allocation of tradable emission 
allowances be viewed as a direct transfer or foregone revenues?  Or are subsidies built directly 
into a market-based environmental policy given broad berth?  How important is the point of 
compliance for emissions permits when trade is involved?  Any discrepancies among treatment 
of economically similar policies will affect their attractiveness to policymakers, particularly 
when competitiveness is a sensitive issue. 
There is a natural tension between national sovereignty over environmental policy, free 
trade, and efficient environmental policy.  On the one hand, some aspects of trade institutions 
may encourage efficient and coordinated national environmental policies.  On the other hand, in 
some situations they may restrict countries from designing the most appropriate policy for a 
given problem.  Worse yet, by concerning themselves more with trade barriers than with 
environmental rationales, they may divert protectionist impulses toward influencing 
environmental policies to gain exception to the free trade rules.  Thus, as multilateral 
negotiations continue, disputes are settled and trade institutions evolve, it is important that 
environmental policy concerns be considered in tandem with the trade rules themselves, and not 
simply be relegated to side agreements.  For freer trade to provide the benefits promised, good 
regulatory incentives are needed as well. 
 Resources for the Future  Fischer, Hoffmann, and Yoshino 
25 
References 
Bagwell, Kyle and Robert W. Staiger. (2001) “The WTO as a Mechanism for Securing Market 
Access Property Rights: Implications for Global Labor and Environmental Issues,” 
Columbia University, Department of Economics. Mimeo.  
Bernard, A., C. Fischer, and M. Vielle. (2001).  “Is There a Rationale for Rebating 
Environmental Levies?”  RFF Discussion Paper 01-31.  Washington, DC: Resources for 
the Future. 
Bhagwati, Jagdish. (2002)  Free Trade Today.  (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). 
Birdsall, Nancy, and David Wheeler. (1992)  “Trade Policy and Industrial Pollution in Latin 
America: Where are the Pollution Havens?”  in Patrick Low ed., International Trade and 
the Environment, World Bank Discussion Paper 159.  (Washington, D.C.: The World 
Bank). 
Charnovitz, Steve. (1994)  “Free Trade, Fair Trade, Green Trade: Defogging the Debate,”  
Cornell International Law Journal 27: 459-525. 
-------------- (1997) “A Critical Guide to the WTO's Report on Trade and Environment,” Arizona 
Journal of International and Comparative Law 14(2): 341-379. 
Demaret, Paul and Raoul Stewardson.  (1994) “Border Tax Adjustments under the GATT and 
EC Law and General Implications for Environmental Taxes,” Journal of World Trade 
1994: 5-65. 
GATT Secretariat.  (1991)  GATT Annual Report. (Geneva: GATT). 
Easty, Daniel C. (1994) Greening the GATT: Trade, Environment, and the Future. (Washington, 
D.C.: Institute of International Economics). 
Easty, Daniel C., and Damien Geradin.  (1997) “Market Access, Competitiveness, and 
Harmonization: Environmental Protection in Regional Trade Agreements,” Harvard 
Environmental Law Review 21: 265-336. 
Ederington, Josh.  (2000) “International Coordination of Trade and Domestic Politics,” 
University of Miami, Department of Economics. Mimeo. 
Ederington, Josh, and  Jennie Minier.  (2001)  “Is Environmental Policy A Secondary Trade 
Barrier?: An Empirical Analysis,”  University of Miami, Department of Economics.  
Mimeo. Resources for the Future  Fischer, Hoffmann, and Yoshino 
26 
Faber, Daniel A., and Robert E. Hudec. (1996) “GATT Legal Restraints on Domestic 
Environmental Regulations,”  in Jagdish Bhagwati and Rober E. Hudec, eds., Fair Trade 
and Harmonization Vol. 2: Legal Analysis (Cambridge: MIT Press).  
Fischer, Carolyn (2001).  “Rebating Environmental Policy Revenues: Output-Based Allocations 
and Tradable Performance Standards,” RFF Discussion Paper 01-22.  Washington, DC: 
Resources for the Future. 
Fischer, Carolyn, Suzi Kerr and Michael A. Toman (1998).  “Using Emissions Trading to 
Regulate U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions: An Overview of Policy Design and 
Implementation Issues,” National Tax Journal v51, n3 (September 1998): 453-64. 
Frankel and Rose. (2002) “Is Trade Good or Bad for the Environment? Sorting Out the 
Causality.” Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.  Mimeo. 
Jaffee, Adam B., Steven R. Peterson, Paul R. Portney, and Robert Stavins. (1995)  
“Enivornmental Regulations and the Competitiveness of U.S. Manufacturing: What Does 
the Evidence Tell Us?”  Journal of Economic Literature 33(1): 132-63. 
Kahn, Matthew. (2000) “United State Pollution Intensive Trade Trends from 1972 to 1992,” 
Tafts University. Mimeo.  
Lucas, Robert E.B., David Wheeler, and Hemamala Hettige. (1992)  “Economic Development, 
Environmental Regulation and the International Migration of Toxic Industrial Pollution: 
1960-1988,” in Patrick Low ed., International Trade and the Environment.  World Bank 
Discussion Paper 159.  (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank). 
Natural Resources Defense Council. (2001) “Protecting Old Growth Forests and Endangered 
Species,” NRDC Policy Paper, April, 2001.  
Moore, Michael. (2000) “The Backlash against Globalization?” WTO-DG Speech to Liberal 
International, Ottawa, October 26. 
Oates, Wallace E. (1972) Fiscal Federalism.  (New York: Harcourt Brace Javanovich). 
Pearson, Charles S. (2000)  Economics and the Global Environment. (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press). 
Poterba, James M. and Julio J. Rotemberg. (1995) “Environmental Taxes on Intermediate and 
Final Goods When Both Can Be Imported,”  International Tax and Public Finance 2(2): 
221-28 Resources for the Future  Fischer, Hoffmann, and Yoshino 
27 
Tobey, James A.  (1990) “The Effects of Domestic Environmental Policies on Patterns of World 
Trade: An Empirical Test,” Kyklos 43(2): 191-209. 
Vogel, David.  (1997) “Trouble for Us and Trouble for Them: Social Regulations as Trade 
Barriers,” in Comparative Disadvantages?: Social Regulations and the Global Economy, 
Pietro S. Nivola, Editor.  (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution) 
Werksman, Jacob.  (1999) “Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading and the WTO,” Review of 
European Community & International Environmental Law 8(3): 251-264. 
World Trade Organization.  (1994) Final Act of the 1986–1994 Uruguay Round. (Geneva: World 
Trade Organization). 
World Trade Organization. (1999) Trade and Environment (Special Studies 4). (Geneva: World 
Trade Organization). 
World Trade Organization, Committee on Trade and Environment.  (1997)  Taxes and Charges 
for Environmental Purpose: Border Tax Adjustment (Note by the Secretariat).  
WT/CTE/W/47 (2 May 1997). 
World Trade Organization, Committee on Trade and Environment.  (2002)  GATT/WTO Dispute 
Settlement Practice Relating to GATT Article XX, Paragraphs (b), (d) and (g) - Note by 
the Secretariat.  WT/CTE/W/203 (8 March 2002). Resources for the Future  Fischer, Hoffmann, and Yoshino 
28 















Adjust, except to the extent the 







Adjust for trade 
in input.  
 
Don’t adjust for 
trade in final 
product 
Adjust for trade in input, except to 
the extent the trading partner is lax. 
 
Don’t adjust for trade in final 
product, except to the extent the 
trading partner is lax. 
Adjust for trade in input. 
 
Adjust if physically 
incorporated in final 
product. 
Production  Don’t adjust.  Tax imports to the extent the trading 
partner is lax.  
 
Maintain emissions control 
incentives, but subsidize exports to 
the extent the partner is lax and 
leakage problematic.  
No adjustment 
(except as countervailing 
duty to actionable subsidy 
by trading partner). 
 
No overt subsidies or 
exemptions. 
 
  